Georgia's European Dream
Introduction and Overview
Located at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, Georgia was once considered the in the South泭Caucasus,泭泭And tied to that, Georgias primary foreign policy goal has historically centered on integration in the Euro-Atlantic community, specifically through EU and NATO membership.泭After rising to power in 2012, Georgias ruling party (the Georgian Dream) pledged to pursue a pragmatic relationship with Russia while continually working towards Western integration. Yet,泭despite these promises, Georgia has experienced significant democratic backsliding while pivoting towards Russia, and thereby hindering its chances of further Euro-Atlantic integration. This sharp departure in policy is widely attributed to Georgian Dreams founder and informal leader, Bidzini Ivanishvili, who holds considerable business interests and泭. Nevertheless, the泭question of where Georgias true loyalties lie remains unanswered.泭
Georgias rapprochement with Russia is distressing because it has coincided with a time when Georgias EU ambitions have hit a snag. This assumes, however, that Georgias foreign policy must be either pro-Western or pro-Russian. This creates a false dichotomy and fails to explain Georgias seemingly contradictory actions. If we look past Ivanishvilis personal motivations and influence, Georgian leaders ideology and foreign policy remain rather ambiguous, as the government pursues somewhat incompatible objectives of European integration and normalized relations with Russia. Georgia continues to convey interest in joining Euro-Atlantic alliances,泭,泭, and contributing to NATO missions overseas, as well as泭. However, the Georgian Dream has also strengthened ties with Western adversaries,泭,泭,泭, and泭. To assess Georgias positionality, it is essential to explore the potential reasoning and underlying logic of Georgian leaders statements and political decisions in context. Georgias path to EU candidacy has been marked by three critical junctures which泭help us to explain the inconsistencies of Georgias foreign policy: the 2008 Russo-Georgian war, the rise of the Georgian Dream party in 2012, and the 2022 invasion of泭Ukraine. While the return of great power politics has led many states economic and security policies to become further intertwined, this piece contends that the Georgian Dreams pursuit of economic integration with competing great powers reflects a realist strategy in which Georgian leaders seek to maximize their geostrategic location and minimize vulnerabilities in state security.泭
2008 Russo-Georgian War
After the fall of the Soviet Union, Georgia was nearly a failed state, plagued by economic weakness and corruption. In response to rigged parliamentary elections in November 2003, opposition leaders holding red roses stormed the Georgian Parliament, leading to the resignation of Soviet-era leader Eduard Shevardnadze. The Rose Revolution was viewed favorably in the West as the first nonviolent transfer of power in the Caucasus and demonstrated Georgians commitment to democracy. This marked the beginning of a strained relationship between Georgia and Russia.
After several years of deteriorating relations between Georgia and Russia, tensions reached a breaking point following the泭April 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest, where泭. In August 2008, Russia invaded the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia, which remain occupied to this day. This marked the first occurrence of full-scale Russian aggression against a sovereign nation since the fall of the Soviet Union,泭signaling that Moscow was willing and able to defend its old backyard. In the months that followed, Western leaders offered little support to Georgia, as the泭泭and the new US administration sought to reset relations with Russia. As outlined in the following sections, the historical memory of the 2008 war is routinely泭泭to泭.
Democratic Backsliding Under the Georgian Dream
Since the Rose Revolution, Georgia had been ruled by pro-Western President Mikheil Saakashvili; however,泭泭as well as his perceived role in the 2008 war severely diminished public approval of Saakashvilis United National Movement (UNM) party.泭As Saakashvili neared the end of his second term, billionaire Bidzini Ivanishvili created the Georgian Dream party and formed a coalition of political parties to run against Saakashvili and the UNM. By uniting opposition groups, the Georgian Dream coalition was able to mobilize public support and win the successive 2012 parliamentary and 2013 presidential elections. Once in power, however, the Georgian Dream泭泭through patronage politics, electoral fraud, and targeted prosecution of opposition leaders and journalists.
The Georgian Dream has always included European integration as a part of their party platform, as 80% of Georgians support this goal. Facing a fragmented political opposition, Georgian Dream leaders only need to appear to be working towards these goals. As such, progress towards membership has tended to be symbolic. For example,泭, inscribing the governments commitment to ensure Georgias full integration into the European Union and the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization. Simultaneously, amendments were included to abolish direct presidential elections, strip presidential authority, and concentrate power in the hands of the Prime Minister and Parliament.泭
The Georgian Dreams actions reflect a strategic manipulation of the European integration process to stay in power. To deflect blame and distract from the stalled reform process, leaders of the ruling party accuse opposition leaders of sabotaging the countrys EU prospects. The governments failed impeachment of President Salome Zourabichvili this fall illustrates these tactics. Since breaking with the party, Zourabichvili has expressed sharp泭criticism of the Georgian Dream and stated that Georgia did not deserve EU candidate status in 2022. During her visits with EU leaders at the end of the summer, the Georgian Dream initiated impeachment proceedings against Zourabichvili,泭泭by eroding confidence among EU leaders and exacerbating domestic polarization. Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili and other members of the ruling party have asserted that granting Georgia candidate status would泭. Following a series of meetings with EU leaders in early October, the Prime Minister expressed confidence in EU support for Georgias candidacy after receiving commitments from numerous member states.
War in Ukraine
The Georgian Dreams policies since Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 have increased tension between the Georgian government and Western leaders.泭Georgias reluctance to join EU sanctions against Russia has泭泭who believe prospective EU countries should seek alignment with EU foreign policy. Georgian Prime Minister has pushed back泭Like many other developing nations,泭泭The onset of the war has only exacerbated these problems.泭泭This rapid increase in trade volume has helped Georgias economy rebound泭after a period of steep economic decline during the Covid-19 pandemic.泭While sanctions might deliver a modest blow to Russia, the ramifications could be devastating to Georgia.泭
The Georgian governments rhetoric stirred further controversy at the May 2023 Global Security Forum,泭. Garibashvili was widely condemned by Georgia civil society organizations and the international community for echoing Kremlin propaganda, an accusation泭. Its possible the statement was not intended to be politically charged. After all,泭. The discrepancy in Western responses in 2008 and 2022 remains a sore spot for Georgian leaders, who are vocal in their resentment of the unfair and hypocritical treatment of Georgia.泭
Conclusion
As the EUs final verdict on Georgias candidacy draws near, Georgian Dream leaders are scrambling to restore EU leaders confidence. Failure to obtain candidate status could jeopardize the Georgian Dreams reelection chances in 2024, and their proclaimed strategy of appeasement towards the Kremlin has failed to discourage Russian provocation. In late August, Kremlins security council Deputy Chair Dmitry Medvedev threatened the泭泭of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and recently announced plans to establish a permanent naval base in the occupied region. Russian encroachment on Georgias territory may help Georgia rehabilitate its image, but integration still hinges on perceived Western support. NATO has taken steps in the right direction,泭泭for Georgia,泭, and泭. Meanwhile, the EUs deadline to decide whether to grant Georgia candidate status is fast approaching, and EU leaders are faced with an arduous decision. Granting candidate status would require the EU to overlook Georgias severe democratic deficiencies, while failure to do so risks strengthening Russian influence in the Caucasus.泭
About the Author
Alyssa Durnil is a masters student in 51勛圖s Comparative and Regional Studies program, specializing in Europe and Eurasia. Her research interests include transatlantic relations and泭security and governance in post-Soviet states. She seeks to understand the dynamics of state security in the post-Soviet realm and the role of institutions in shaping domestic and regional outcomes.