The Ankara Agreement: Ukraine's Solution to EU Membership
Introduction
Given the concerns raised by European Union (EU) member states regarding widespread corruption in Ukraine, and in light of the ongoing stalemate between Ukraine and Russia, a pragmatic and mutually advantageous approach for Ukraine-EU relations may involve emulating 啦羹娶域勳聆梗s association with the EU rather than pursuing immediate full EU泭. Rather than seek full membership, the EU and Ukraine should explore a comparable framework akin to the Ankara Agreement. Adopting such an approach could serve as a model for Ukraine's engagement with the EU, offering potential benefits for both parties across various dimensions.
The Ankara Agreement
The Ankara Agreement, officially known as the Agreement Creating an Association Between the Republic of T羹rkiye and the European Economic Community, was泭泭on September 12, 1963. It established a framework for cooperation and eventual integration between T羹rkiye and the European Economic Community (EEC), the predecessor to the EU.泭While the Ankara Agreement did not explicitly commit to granting T羹rkiye full EU membership, it articulated the goal of eventual accession through a泭泭comprising of a preparatory stage, a transitional stage, and a final stage. The agreement was ultimately intended to establish a customs union between T羹rkiye and the EU, and it laid the groundwork for 啦羹娶域勳聆梗s potential candidacy for EU membership.泭
The primary goal of the Ankara Agreement was to create an association between T羹rkiye and the EEC to promote economic integration, political cooperation, and the harmonization of laws and regulations. One of the significant components of the agreement was the establishment of a customs union. This aimed to eliminate tariffs and trade barriers between the EEC and T羹rkiye, fostering closer economic cooperation. The agreement eliminated customs duties and tariffs on泭. By doing so, it created a unified market, allowing for the seamless flow of goods without trade barriers, meaning that products manufactured in T羹rkiye or the EEC could circulate without facing customs restrictions or additional tariffs, promoting a more efficient allocation of resources. This had many泭泭for consumers and businesses in both T羹rkiye and the EEC. Consumers benefited from a wider variety of goods at potentially lower prices, while businesses could access larger markets and enjoy economies of scale.泭
Additionally, the Ankara Agreement established a Common External Tariff, meaning that T羹rkiye泭泭the EECs tariff rates and trade policies concerning third countries. This was a significant step toward economic integration, as it ensured a uniform approach to external trade. Over the years, additional protocols were signed to update and expand the scope of the Ankara Agreement. Most notably, the Additional Protocol signed in 1970 extended the customs union to cover the free movement of workers, agricultural products, and other economic泭. The effect of the Ankara Agreement and Additional Protocol in 1970 on 啦羹娶域勳聆梗s GDP was significant. In 1961, 啦羹娶域勳聆梗s GDP was $7.99 billion, and in 1973 its GDP泭泭to $26 billion. T羹rkiye applied to join the then-EEC in 1987, received candidate status in 1999, and started the泭泭process in 2005. Despite initial aspirations for full EU membership, 啦羹娶域勳聆梗s path to accession faced numerous challenges and delays over the years. The EU has noted that T羹rkiye has not met its泭泭on issues like the fight against corruption and judicial cooperation. Additionally, issues such as human rights concerns, political differences, and Cyprus-related disputes泭泭to the slow progress.
Similar Challenges and Similar Goals
Today, one of the major issues hampering Ukraines prospective accession to the EU is the pervasive issue of corruption, a challenge also identified in泭泭bid for EU accession. According to the Corruption Perceptions Index, Ukraine and T羹rkiye have comparable rankings in泭. Corruption in Ukraine predates its ongoing conflict with Russia, prompting the European Commission to泭泭intensified efforts to further strengthen the fight against corruption, in particular at high level, through proactive and efficient investigations, and a credible track record of prosecutions and convictions. Additionally, the European Commission泭泭that Ukraine must take structural reforms to remove corruption, reduce the State footprint and the persistent influence of oligarchs, strengthen private property rights and enhance labour market flexibility to improve the functioning of its market economy. The pervasiveness of corruption in Ukraine is underscored by Transparency Internationals 2016 report, indicating that between 38% to 42% of Ukrainian households reported paying泭泭for basic public services, a disconcertingly泭. Thus, if the EUs reservations regarding corruption in Ukraine impede accession, an agreement modeled on the Ankara Agreement may represent a prudent course of action for fostering mutually beneficial relations between both parties.
In addition to economic corruption, Ukraines泭泭has been a topic of concern in its accession negotiations with the EU. The泭泭of reform in the judicial realm has hampered Ukraines ability to conform to EU judicial standards. For example, the Ukrainian Constitutional Court (UCC)泭泭the cornerstones of Ukraines anti-corruption reforms. By undermining the reforms, the UCCs泭泭may lead to the end of IMF lending and a cancellation of Ukraines visa-free travel agreement with the EU. The UCC did not explain its decision, but泭泭that judges were concerned about how they might be affected by anti-corruption prosecutions.
If the EU opts against granting Ukraine full EU membership, citing substantial impediments such as pervasive corruption, yet desires to establish collaborative ties involving market and judicial systems, a viable approach could entail modeling an association based on the Ankara Agreement to govern their relations. This would benefit both countries while also upholding the rigorous EU standards for membership. To illustrate, a negotiated agreement akin to the Ankara Agreement could yield a significant trade agreement, facilitating the removal of trade barriers between the two entities and streamlining trade in both regions. Additionally, the EU could extend preferential access to its extensive market, potentially augmenting Ukrainian exports and fostering economic growth in both Ukraine and the EU. For example, according to the European Commission, Ukraine accounts for 10% of the world wheat market, 15% of the corn market, and 13% of the barley泭. With little to no tariffs or customs costs in trading these commodities with the EU, both Ukraine and the EU stand to derive substantial benefits. Thus, parallel to the Ankara Agreement, an agreement between Ukraine and the EU could encompass the harmonization of regulatory standards and trade policies, facilitating business compliance with EU regulations and bolstering competitiveness in the European market. Coordination on such matters would be conducive to fostering a more integrated and mutually advantageous relationship between Ukraine and the EU.
About the Author
Rami Alkhafaji is currently a second-year JD candidate at the 51勛圖 Washington College of Law. Rami has previously completed a Bachelor of Arts degree in Global Affairs with a concentration in Global Governance at George Mason University where he graduated summa cum laude. He is interested in international law, foreign policy, and the development of emerging markets. Rami is also an active member of his schools International Law Student Association and Transactional Negotiation Team and enjoys tennis and soccer.泭